There is some controversy regarding both the meaning of "accelerationism" and its appropriation by a contemporary strand of left-wingbroadly egalitarian and anti-capitalistpolitical theory. The term was introduced into political discourse by Benjamin Noys to describe a trend in French theory that had begun with the publication of Deleuze and Guattari's Anti-Oedipus. 1 This had been pursued further in the anglophone world by the Cybernetic Culture Research Unit (CCRU) and Nick Land (whose evolution into a thinker of the neo-reactionary right raised difficult questions regarding the provenance and eventual fate of associated intellectual trends). 2 The defining idea was that within capitalism there remains 5 A N G E L A K I journal of the theoretical humanities volume 24 number 1 february 2019 INTRODUCTION james trafford pete wolfendale ALIEN VECTORS accelerationism, xenofeminism, inhumanism an emancipatory tendency that must be accelerated in such a way that its oppressive elements, and perhaps even capitalism as such, might be dissolved. However, Noys took this to imply that "the worse the better." 3 This interpretation gave rise to a persistent misunderstanding that has haunted the term since, namely, that the purpose of acceleration is to intensify the internal contradictions of capitalism envisaged by Marx, or to deepen immiseration in order to hasten revolution. 4 The common thread running from every proposed antecedent to accelerationism (e.g., Marx, Federov, Veblen, etc.) to every avowed variant of it (e.g., left, right, unconditional, etc.) is that they valorise the acceleration of positive tendencies at the expense of negative ones, no matter how much they may disagree about which tendencies are which, and whether they will lead us beyond capitalism or deeper into it. 5 It was Mark Fisher who initially proposed to take back the term as a name for an active political project, developing themes from his work with the CCRU in an explicitly egalitarian and anti-capitalist direction. However, it wasn't until Alex Williams and Nick Srnicek's "#Accelerate: Manifesto for an Accelerationist Politics" that what would come to be called "left-accelerationism" was articulated:
We believe the most important division in today's left is between those that hold to a folk politics of localism, direct action, and relentless horizontalism, and those that outline what must become called an accelerationist politics at ease with a modernity of abstraction, complexity, globality, and technology. The former remains content with establishing small and temporary spaces of non-capitalist social relations, eschewing the real problems entailed in facing foes which are intrinsically non-local, abstract, and rooted deep in our everyday infrastructure. The failure of such politics has been builtin from the very beginning. By contrast, an accelerationist politics seeks to preserve the gains of late capitalism while going further than its value system, governance structures, and mass pathologies will allow. 6
The result is a politics that treats the transition from capitalism to postcapitalism as a complex historical process akin to the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Europe, and which advocates for strategic intervention in this process: championing the emancipatory tendencies of modernity against the oppressive strictures of capitalism to which they have hitherto been bound. The philosophical underpinnings of this project have since been developed in the work of Ray Brassier, Reza Negarestani, and Benedict Singleton, among others, while its more immediate political consequences have been explored in Srnicek and Williams's own Inventing the Future, which advocates embracing the increasing automation of work and supporting universal basic income (UBI) as a transitional demand. 7 Nevertheless, ongoing confusion regarding the term "accelerationism" and its use by divergent political tendencies (e.g., the pro-capitalist right accelerationism inspired by Land, and the socalled "unconditional" accelerationism more reminiscent of the CCRU) have unquestionably dulled its utility for the left, leading many to downplay or abandon it entirely. 8 As such, it can be difficult to establish left-accelerationism's intellectual coherence beyond its sociological formations.
The case of xenofeminism is somewhat different. Inspired by the technofeminism of Shulamith Firestone as much as the cyberfeminism of Sadie Plant and VNS Matrix, The Xenofeminist Manifesto written by the Laboria Cuboniks collective shares many theoretical concerns with left-accelerationisme.g., embracing technology, complexity, and abstractionalong with a practical concern with the importance of strategy, but its inherent multiplicity and mutability are a deliberate reflection of these concerns. It is proposed not as a doctrine, but as a platform. This should not be taken to imply that xenofeminism lacks intellectual coherence. On the one hand, it critiques certain conceptual pitfalls to which it thinks other feminisms are prone, celebrating impurity and transformation while excoriating every possible appeal to nature:
We need new affordances of perception and action unblinkered by naturalised identities. In the name of feminism, "Nature" shall no editorial introduction longer be a refuge of injustice, or a basis for any political justification whatsoever! If nature is unjust, change nature! 9
On the other, it develops a new, generic conception of universality that is not indifferent to questions of identity:
Xenofeminism understands that the viability of emancipatory abolitionist projectsthe abolition of class, gender, and racehinges on a profound reworking of the universal. The universal must be grasped as generic, which is to say, intersectional. Intersectionality is not the morcellation of collectives into a static fuzz of cross-referenced identities, but a political orientation that slices through every particular, refusing the crass pigeonholing of bodies. This is not a universal that can be imposed from above, but built from the bottom upor, better, laterally, opening new lines of transit across an uneven landscape. This non-absolute, generic universality must guard against the facile tendency of conflation with bloated, unmarked particularsnamely Eurocentric universalismwhereby the male is mistaken for the sexless, the white for raceless, the cis for the real, and so on. Absent such a universal, the abolition of class will remain a bourgeois fantasy, the abolition of race will remain a tacit white-supremacism, and the abolition of gender will remain a thinly veiled misogyny, evenespeciallywhen prosecuted by avowed feminists themselves. 10 Xenofeminism thus extends the concerns of leftaccelerationism not simply by addressing the personal dimension of the political but also by synthesising its modern ideals with postmodern critiques of the corresponding historical realities.
A less obvious link between left-accelerationism and xenofeminism is the influence of philosophical ideas explored in the work of Ray Brassier, Reza Negarestani, and Peter Wolfendale and increasingly grouped under the heading of "neo-rationalism." This work is characterised by a desire to combine the critical and systematic concerns of the Continental traditionas exemplified by Kant, Hegel, and Marxwith important advances in epistemology, semantics, and the philosophy of science pursued in the Analytic traditiondrawing particular influence from Wilfrid Sellars and Robert Brandom. If nothing else, neo-rationalism aims to give an account of the nature and significance of rational agency that neither indexes rationality to some common sensibility nor imputes agency to some metaphysical supplement inexplicable from the perspective of natural science. On the one hand, it draws a functional distinction between sentience and sapience in terms of the difference between reliable differential response (e.g., uttering "x is red" in the presence of red things) and conceptual competence (e.g., understanding that "x is red" implies "x is not green"), 11 or "the capacity to engage in discursive practices" more generally. 12 On the other, it articulates the normative rift between nature and culture in terms of autonomy, or the capacity for individual and collective self-determination. 13 However, though these distinctions seem merely to echo the traditional division between the animal (sentient/nature) and human (sapient/culture) domains, neo-rationalism claims that rational agency can be realised in diverse material substrates and divergent forms of life: humans, animals, extraterrestrials, and machines alike can adopt the role of sapient subjects and autonomous agents, provided they possess the corresponding capacities.
It is for this reason that Reza Negarestani's "The Labor of the Inhuman" instigates the project of rationalist inhumanism, extending these rationalist ideas to debates regarding the fate of humanism and the emergence of posthumanism. The project aims to extract the essential core of humanism by discarding those features that are consequences of indexing rational agency to the biology, psychology, and cultural history of Homo sapiens. From this perspective, reason is an abstract protocol that has been functionally implemented by the techno-linguistic infrastructure of human culture, 14 and freedom is an "insurrectionary force" that has bootstrapped itself out of evolutionary pre-adaptations and reformatted the human species as a suitable processing platform. 15 It is this attempt to locate an alien vector within humanism which pushes it trafford & wolfendale beyond itself that calls for the prefix in-rather than anti-, post-, or even trans-. Negarestani invokes Foucault in order to describe this dynamic:
A universal wave that erases the self-portrait of man drawn in sand, inhumanism is a vector of revision. It relentlessly revises what it means to be human by removing its supposedly self-evident characteristics while preserving certain invariances. 16 In so far as the concept of the human articulates our cultural self-understanding it is not merely subject to passive change but open to active revision in accordance with the ideal of collective self-determination. Rationalist inhumanism turns humanism's commitment to self-determination upon itself by elaborating the consequences of this radical revisability.
The practical consequence of this theoretical vector is a form of prometheanism: "the project of re-engineering ourselves and our world on a more rational basis." 17 If inhumanism treats "supposedly self-evident characteristics" of humanitysuch as vocational sociality and dimorphic sexualityas conceptual determinations to be discarded in searching for minimal conditions for abstract autonomy, then prometheanism treats these same characteristics as empirical obstacles to be surmounted in achieving maximal conditions for concrete freedom. It is here that we recover our common thread, in so far as left-accelerationism and xenofeminism are promethean projects that aim to overcome precisely these obstacles: exploiting the economic processes unravelling the familiar world of wage labour as a means towards a post-work political platform, and incorporating the socio-technological innovations unsettling extant identities into an exploratory programme that ramifies existing modes of selfhood and integrates them into a generic model of autonomy. This is what is meant by embracing alienation as a positive force, transforming our progressive exile from a series of Edenic harmoniesbe they economic, sociological, or otherwise anthropological into an esoteric genealogy of freedom.
However, in this light, it is important to consider the political and philosophical pitfalls and problems befalling such a promethean programme. For example, whilst the preservation of local conditions under the auspices of the "other" may lead to problematically conservative politics, so too would uncritical appeals to modernity, artificiality, and rationalism reproduce relations of domination consolidated in the inextricable relationship between Eurocentric colonialism and modernity/rationality. As Denise Ferreira da Silva argues, the history of Western reason constituting our understanding of the Modern subject rendered non-European inhabitants subject to the effects and power of Reason, which subsists internally to European man. 18 The non-European is thereby relegated to the domain of causesto that which is intrinsically "affectable" and external to reasonand this, in turn, constituted European whiteness as indigenous to reason. Difference and otherness are thus forced into cultural hierarchies, and the relation between European and non-European cultures is figured as a relation between "subject" and "object," as Anı́bal Quijano remarks. 19 In other words, the racialised other "alwaysalready signifies outsideness to the territory of the universal principles." 20 We should be aware, then, that the figure of the Alien emerges as potentially already captured within the circuitry of European modernity. It is necessary to consider, for example, the ways in which "xeno" indexes a racially coded outside, whose adoption is difficult to swallow for many for whom alienation has indexed the (ongoing) exclusion from full citizenship in metropolitan states. Furthermore, a romanticisation of the "Alien inside" all too easily leads to the obscuring of a privileged relation to the human subject even in its attempted escape. This would be to rush towards the universalisation of the Alien, rather than to account for its establishment through spatialised differentiations that were rooted in the production of the Alien as coconstitutive with the human subject proper. As such, we should ask whether these editorial introduction problematics may be enacted: in the fetishisation of technologies specifically oriented around the capital labour relation local to the Global North; in potentially universalising appeals to the "xeno"; and in the disparagement of horizontal political strategy as "folk politics."
This might also challenge our political preconceptions, particularly regarding the often totalising gesture in which the logics of neoliberalism are supposed to have shaped all subjectivitiesthat we have reached a form of hegemony that has overtaken the dynamics of inclusion and exclusion of liberal political forms, absolutising and expanding exclusion inside capitalist realism. It is certainly the case that neoliberal economies have expelled labour from the formal wage, and "toward both an absolute and a relative increase of surplus population consigned to the informal economy." 21 Moreover, the combination of "redistribution of wealth upwards" through capital expansion since the 1980s 22 and rising levels of unemployment and precarious work do seem to threaten "not simply to marginalise the poor but to condemn them to outright social and economic redundancy." 23 But we should also consider the "division between full humans who possess the right to sell their labor and compete within markets, and those that are disposable, discriminated against, and ultimately either eliminated or superexploited." 24 There are distinctions to be made, for example, between the constitution of a relative surplus population of potentially proletarianised wage-labourers and the establishment of racialised populations as redundant and pathologised citizens. To borrow from Patrick Wolfe, relationships predicated on exploitation of labour require the reproduction of living labour, but a relationship premised on expulsion and exclusion requires extermination. 25 As such, we should be wary of approaches that universalise our recent neoliberal histories as the "management of populations with the aim of cultivating […] individualistic, competitive, acquisitive and entrepreneurial behaviour." 26 These minimise the experience of those populations that are determined to fail to conform to such management. If we fail to bear this social and political context in mind we may well end up with a politics of the human or, indeed, the posthuman, which "yokes humanity to the limited possessive individualism of Man," as Weheliye puts it. 27 That is to say, we would assume that the accelerated vectors of neoliberal economics have produced a situation in which "all subjects have been granted equal access to western humanity and that it is this humanism that we all want to overcome." 28 Nonetheless, we should equally ask if it is possible to consider a politics of rationality, not by disarticulating it from power and context but by actively working against its current parochialism. As Quijano puts it,
[n]othing is less rational, finally, than the pretension that the specific cosmic vision of a particular ethnie should be taken as universal rationality, even if such an ethnie is called Western Europe because this is actually [to] pretend to impose a provincialism as universalism. 29 Further still, it may be possible to think about that reflexive moment in which we develop consciousness as bringing with it a form of alienation not rooted in isolated individual subjectivity but in the active collective capacity to re-forge our relationship with the world. This would operate against the ontologisation of the "other," or calls for the benevolent inclusion of those previously excluded that replicate the very configurations of colonialist, racist, and patriarchal power they seek to transcend. Might we not, thereby, follow in the steps of Gloria Anzaldúa's analysis of an "alien consciousness" rooted in histories of struggle traversing local and global contexts? 30 Perhaps this could index forms of emancipation that do justice to our spatial and collective differences without being routed through the requirement to continuously prove an ever-precarious humanity.
The papers exploring these questions are grouped loosely into three sections: namely politics, posthumanism, and alienation.
The first three are all concerned with the contemporary political landscape, developing an account of the relationship between collective organisation and social norms. This is taken up by Williams in relation to the left-accelerationist emphasis on hegemony, strategy, and rationality. Articulating a possible relationship between hegemony and rationality, Williams develops an analysis of the connections between power and rationality as a means of responding to criticisms of left-accelerationism. To do so, he advances an understanding of strategy-without-a-strategisera distributed and emergent strategic orientation which mediates the power/rationality binary. Reed's paper similarly considers a normative account of purposefulness to develop a political theory in the context of the interface as a distributed site of generative meaning. The paper develops this in the context of situated knowledgeoften under-accounted-for in similar debateswhilst articulating this in terms of distributed sites of non-linear, and complex, interconnection. At the core of Trafford's paper is an account of structural injustices developed through the lens of generatively entrenched normative structures. This is employed to analyse dominant analyses of neoliberalism that have figured racial injustices as ideological fossils to be swept away by a fundamentally differenceneutral political economy. Instead, it is argued that racialised power can be understood as a productive technology fundamental to the structuring of our worldstheir neoliberal organisation just one iteration of ongoing coloniality.
The second three papers are concerned primarily with considering the nature of agency/ cognition and the possibility of non-human/ posthuman sapience. Wolfendale takes up an entrenched picture of the human as rational animal in the context of recent posthumanisms that call for its dissolution. In distinction from both critical posthumanism and transhumanism, Wolfendale proceeds to outline a rationalist inhumanism, which unbinds rationality from animality and considers the eventual liberation of reason from the animal that is Homo sapiens. Hester's work is similarly concerned with posthumanism, though primarily in the context of a feminist posthumanism that has emphasised the de-prioritisation or rescinding of the privilege of the human. This has often gone handin-hand with the idea that humanity is but one element of a wider ecology of interdependent forces, and that we have a distributed responsibility through our inextricability from them. Drawing upon xenofeminist approaches, Hester argues that we can be on the side of the human without neglecting the assemblages of which we are all a part by conceiving of humanity as a site of nascent potential for sapience + care. In a similar vein, Parisi considers the ways in which our visions of the future have become pervasively constituted by the inevitability of planetary automation. In this context, Parisi asks whether it is possible to think the "alien" in such a vision of machine thinking. To consider this, she analyses contemporary artificial intelligence such as neural nets whose predictive learning generates models for what has not yet been thoughtdo these generative machines produce percepts and concepts that are indeterminate, unpredictable, and alien? Developing Octavia E. Butler's farsighted story of Mary in Mind of My Mind, Parisi considers the alien formation of an intuitive patterning, and of alien image-models ready to take over the transcendental schema of the Patternist.
The final set of papers are all concerned with alienation as a transformative tendency, be it as a dialectical process, emancipatory potential, or hyperstitional praxis. Brassier's concern is in articulating the role of "self-estranging sameness" for Marx's materialist political philosophy. A foundational requirement for Marx's account of political freedom, this is problematised by the constraints of his materialist account of humanity: if the human is simply a set of social relations, this leaves open no unactualised potentiality for their overcoming; yet, if there is a form of unactualised potentiality that lies beyond these social relations, we risk re-substantialising it as an a-historical essence. Pushing beyond this dilemma, Brassier argues that Hegel's self-estranging sameness can dissolve the apparent dichotomy between editorial introduction immanence and transcendence. This rests upon thinking estrangement and de-estrangement as twin facets of the same practices, in which deestrangement emerges through an enabling estrangement. The emphasis upon alienation as constructive and positive force is carried through into Bauer's paper, which considers complex capacities of reason and abstraction in relation to thinking politics at scale. Drawing upon a xenofeminist approach, Bauer argues for an account of alienation as a conditioning estrangementrather than only inhibiting what humans can do, alienation is also generative of political emancipation since it is rooted in the estrangement between our sapience and our sentience. This makes way for an account of freedom in relation to capacity building, articulated in the compelling consideration of the atrocities of Grenfell Tower. This is to retool our capacities for reason and abstraction in order to design what a future ought to be: open to regular revision in response to our practical behaviours, given the persistent contingency of the conditions in which we are immersed. Considerations of temporality are also taken up by Sheldon, whose primary concern is to think about whether accelerationism can offer a robust theory of the future as a subject for political contestation. By situating accelerationism in the context of queer theory, Sheldon interrogates accelerationism's rationality through its Occultic involutionthe autonomy of reason no more implies its location in the human than it suggests its sovereign mastery over all other forces. Undoing itself, Sheldon argues that accelerationist rationality thereby forms a platform for a queer-future-working and the thinking of the becoming-woman of time.
Punctuating these papers are images made by the artist Luke Pendrell. Pendrell's work has intersected with many of the authors of the papers contained in this issue, primarily through his involvement in the Speculative Aesthetics project and subsequent series at Tate Britain. 31 In a nod to the emphasis on revisionary vectors of thought running through this special issue, this work considers the ways in which, throughout human history, maps have defined our limits as much as charted our exploration. For Pendrell, these images act as a kind of ghost visiona spectral overlay of the world created and accessed as data sets, satellite imagery, and geopolitical mapping, merged in an algorithmically generated 3D mesh. This brings with it a view of the world in which complementary and competing navigational vectors collage and collide. Yet, for all its apparent hyper-modern otherness, its novelty and dexterity is still oriented around and contingent upon the temporal and electromagnetic limits of our biological inheritance.
The issue ends in elegiac form. As mentioned above, Mark Fisher was instrumental in setting up and continuing many of the trains of thought that are woven throughout the work here. But not only this -Mark was and is our close friend. His loss both personally and professionally is unfathomable, and rests hard upon all of us. We dedicate this issue to Mark, ending with Dominic Fox's elegy:
We're walking back somewhere, in no great hurry;
and that is my last active memory of you in person, shorn of pseudonym. notes 1 Noys, The Persistence of the Negative. 8 It is worth noting that the term "accelerationism" does not appear anywhere in the main text of Inventing the Future. 
